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On July 13, 1571, King Philip II of Spain, via a real cédula, authorized the Audiencia of Santo 
Domingo to enact plans to “conquer” a community of African cimarrones (maroons, runaway 
slaves) located about 36 miles from the city of Santo Domingo. The king offered to those who 
ventured forth compensation in the form of the cimarrones they captured as slaves.1 At face 
value, the substance of this order was not particularly unique. Since the 1520s, runaway 
African slaves had formed maroon communities in remote regions bordering Spanish 
conquests. By the 1570s, African maroons could be found in practically every part of Spanish 
America.2 The uniqueness of Philip’s order comes from the choice of language, in particular 
the decision to label the expedition a conquest. In most cases, the monarch or his officials 
used words like ‘reduce’ (reducir/reducciones), ‘pacify’ (pacificar/pacificación), ‘castigate’ 
(castigar), or ‘dislodge’ (desechar) to describe the goal of such campaigns. By describing an 
anti-maroon campaign as a conquest, this cédula went against the dominant Spanish narrative 
of the sixteenth century, in which resistance, especially by Africans or native groups, signified 
a punctuated disturbance of an ostensibly stable and coherent postconquest colonial order. 
The wording of the cédula, and the maroon movements to which it responded, explicitly link 
anti-maroon campaigns to the process of Spanish conquest. This article suggests that Spanish-
maroon contestation on Hispaniola should be construed as an integral piece of a prolonged 
and often incomplete Spanish conquest. More importantly, this reevaluation of the conflict 
reveals maroons to be conquerors in their own right. 
 
The English word ‘maroon’ derives from the Spanish cimarrón. Dating from the earliest years 
of Spanish settlement in the Caribbean, cimarrón could be applied to indigenous groups, 
Africans, and even livestock that had ‘gone wild’ or fled outside of Spanish control. The word 
derives from the Taino root símara meaning arrow. Within decades after contact, Spaniards 
had appropriated a derivation, símaran, meaning ‘wild, savage, gone astray,’ as cimarrón.3 On 
Hispaniola, the first significant use of the term came in 1519 when an indigenous leader, 
Enrique, fled with members of his community to a remote region named the Bahoruco where 
they lived outside Spanish control for over a decade. In the years that followed, runaway 
slaves who chose to establish themselves in remote communities came to be known as 
cimarrones. 
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Marronage constitutes one of several forms of resistance to the institution of slavery.4 
Scholars divide marronage into two forms: ‘petit marronage’ and ‘grand marronage.’5 Slaves 
engaging in petit marronage typically fled for short periods, individually or in small groups. 
Absences lasted days to weeks, and slaves often returned of their own accord. Grand 
marronage differed from petit marronage in scale and intent: it involved large groups of 
slaves, who having fled slavery, banded together to form autonomous communities.6 
 
This article examines African individuals who engaged in both forms of marronage. In 
looking back at sixteenth-century Hispaniola, the division between petit and grand marronage 
appears blurry. Spanish sources often use negros cimarrones (black maroons), negros alzados 
(black rebels), and negros huidos (runaway blacks) to refer to Africans who had fled Spanish 
masters and resisted recapture, at times interchangeably. The first two terms correspond to 
manifestations of grand marronage, whereas the third is more commonly associated with petit 
marronage. Sadly for the historian, the documents do not allow for fine-grained differentiation 
between slaves engaged in short-term flight and those seeking a more permanent escape.7 
Moreover, the documents suggest that on Hispaniola petit marronage could transition into 
grand marronage quite fluidly as individual slaves or small groups became incorporated into 
long-standing maroon communities. Consequently, in order to assess marronage in its varied 
forms I use the term maroon to refer to individuals engaged in both forms of flight. 
 
This article challenges traditional assumptions about slavery, slave resistance, and 
colonialism. Most scholars of maroons on Hispaniola and elsewhere view marronage as a 
problem of colonialism, not a problem of conquest.8 Following this view, African slaves were 
colonial subjects, forcibly brought into the Americas through the developing transatlantic 
slave trade. Within the colonial setting, marronage represented a powerful form of resistance 
to the colonial institution of slavery and its abusive and dehumanizing assault on the enslaved. 
While this view honors the economic, social, and cultural forces that brought Africans to the 
Americas and contributed to their resistance, such an interpretation overlooks the reality that 
once outside of Spanish control African maroons established self-governing, autonomous 
communities—and at times kingdoms—that challenged the attempted consolidation of 
Spanish conquests. Importantly, this article expands our understanding of marronage by 
suggesting that such activities embodied both a form of resistance and, at least in some 
contexts, an act of conquest. 
 
                                                     
4.  See John K. Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800, 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 272–303. 
5.  Arrom and Arévalo describe the two types of maroons as “cimarrones simples, nómadas o 
errantes,” a category synonymous with petit marronage, and “cimarrones sedentarios o apalencados” a 
category indicative of grand marronage. José Juan Arrom and Manuel Antonio García Arévalo, 
Cimarrón (Santo Domingo: Ediciones Fundación García-Arévalo, 1986), 34. 
6.  In some contexts, this type could also refer to individual flight of extended duration. 
7.  Runaway slave notices and records of slave catchers from later periods have offered glimpses of 
the differences between these two forms of marronage. 
8.  Deive, La esclavitud del negro, 2:431; Roberto Cassá and Genaro Rodríguez Morel, 
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Cartagena. El costo de una guerrilla en el siglo XVII,” Cahiers du Monde Hispanique et Luso-Brésilien 
49 (1987), 77–79. 
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In reconfiguring Spanish-maroon conflict as part and parcel of the Spanish conquest of the 
Americas, this article expands on what has come to be known as New Conquest History.9 
Since at least the 1990s, scholars have begun to reappraise the Spanish conquest and the 
traditional triumphalist narrative constructed by Spanish conquistadors and perpetuated by 
many historians. By engaging in more critical readings of Spanish sources, often in 
conjunction with indigenous sources, these scholars have revealed that Spanish military, 
political, social, and religious conquests often took decades, if not centuries, to achieve. As 
Matthew Restall argues, Spanish ideologies of conquest conflated actions that established 
‘claims to possession’ with actual possession.10  
 
Consequently, conflicts occurring after the imposition of Spanish dominion and the founding 
of settlements were not recognized as aspects of the conquest itself but instead became 
rebellions and uprisings, even when those conflicts involved groups untouched by earlier 
campaigns of conquest.11 In most cases, New Conquest History has turned our attention to the 
important roles played by indigenous people as allied conquistadors or persistent opponents of 
Spanish conquest efforts. Yet, Africans slaves and servants accompanied most Spanish 
conquest expeditions. Like their Spanish counterparts, these black conquistadors frequently 
sought remuneration for their services, and a handful of studies have revealed the significance 
of their participation in the process of Spanish conquest and colonization.12  
 
Although other scholars have examined the history of early maroon activity on Hispaniola, 
this article seeks to reframe the narrative of these events in the lens of New Conquest 
History.13 In his study of black conquistadors, Matthew Restall categorized members of 
maroon communities as “counter- conquistadors.”14 Following Restall’s proposition, this 
analysis emphasizes that maroon communities were not just antagonists to Spanish 
colonialism but also represented sites of conquest that undermined Spanish claims to 
possession in the sixteenth century and beyond. 
 
 
CONSTITUTING A MAROON CONQUEST 
 
The concept of ‘conquest’ poses a particularly troublesome problem for scholars of the 
Atlantic world. All European powers who claimed territory in the Americas did so by some 
combination of warfare, settlement, negotiation, and at times alliances, with Native 
                                                     
9.  Matthew Restall, “The New Conquest History,” History Compass 10:2 (2012), accessed 
November 14, 2016. doi: 10.1111/j.1478-0542.2011.00822.x 
10.  Matthew Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 68. 
11.  Ida Altman, The War for Mexico’s West: Indians and Spaniards in New Galicia, 1524–1550 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010), 3–6; Grant D. Jones, The Conquest of the Last 
Maya Kingdom (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
12.  Matthew Restall, “Black Conquistadors: Armed Africans in Early Spanish America,” The 
Americas 57:2 (2000): 171–205; R. E. Alegría, Juan Garrido: el conquistador negro en las Antillas, 
Florida, México y California (San Juan: Centro de Estudios Avanzados de Puerto Rico y el Caribe, 
2004); Robert C. Schwaller, “‘For Honor and Defense’:’ Race and the Right to Bear Arms in Early 
Colonial Mexico,” Colonial Latin American Review 21:2 (2012): 239–266; Peter Gerhard, “A Black 
Conquistador in Mexico,” Hispanic American Historical Review 58:3 (1978): 451–459. 
13.  In particular, see Carlos Esteban Deive, La esclavitud del negro en Santo Domingo, Vol. 1; 
Dieve, Los guerrilleros negros. 
14.  Restall, “Black Conquistadors,” 199–204. 
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Americans. Yet, only Spaniards labeled their acquisitions “conquests.”15 Consequently, many 
of our views regarding conquest remain grounded in Eurocentric (here, Spanish) expressions 
of this process. Works of New Conquest History have expanded our understanding of the 
meanings of conquest by revealing how indigenous groups approached alliance or resistance 
to Spanish campaigns of conquest. This article adds to a more diverse understanding of 
conquest in early Latin America by positing that maroons engaged in distinctive conquests 
and that these can be understood in relation to European and African traditions of conquest. 
 
Spaniards did not conquer land, they conquered people—and only by extension the lands 
occupied by the conquered. This emphasis on people, not land, can be seen in a variety of 
ways. Spaniards justified a right to conquer based on an association between preaching 
Christianity to newly discovered people and European notions of a ‘just war.’ From 1493 
onward, the papacy supported Spanish claims in the Americas, on the condition that Spaniards 
spread Christianity among the people of those lands. If the people Spaniards encountered in 
the Americas refused to convert or opposed Spanish claims through war, the Spanish could 
engage in a just war to subdue those recalcitrant groups and establish dominion over their 
people and lands. 
 
In 1513, the Spanish monarchy entrenched this link between conquest and religion in a 
document called the requerimiento. Intended as an ultimatum to be read in the presence of 
indigenous people, the requerimiento demanded, in a thoroughly Spanish-European manner, 
that indigenous people acknowledge the superiority of the Christian faith and consent to 
predication by missionaries.16 Ideally, the crown required conquistadors to pronounce the 
requerimiento, although not necessarily in an indigenous language, prior to the start of 
military conflict. In practice, conquistadors rarely engaged in the formal process demanded by 
their monarchs.17 Nevertheless, the requerimiento and its legalism constitute one context for 
the Spanish association of conquest with the subjugation of people. 
 
More practically, the process of Spanish conquest demonstrates that Spaniards consciously 
targeted populous regions of the Americas inhabited by sedentary agriculturalists.18 After the 
initial settlement in the Caribbean, Spanish expeditions routinely bypassed dispersed, semi-
sedentary, and non-sedentary groups.19 Only when the exploitation of resources drew 
Spaniards into such regions did conquests occur, and in general those regions proved the most 
prone to protracted campaigns of pacification. In so far as Spanish dominion extended over 
territory, it did so as a consequence of the conquest of its inhabitants. In fact, the Spanish 
perceived uninhabited lands as useless, not worth conquering. Such places received the label 
despoblado. Nevertheless, few areas of the Americas lacked any human presence. Instead, 
                                                     
15.  Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 70. 
16.  Seed, Ceremonies of Possession, 70–71. 
17.  Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 1492–1700 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 90. 
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Spanish America and Brazil, Cambridge Latin American Studies (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 83. 
19.  The discovery of silver in the north-central region of Mexico led to more than a half-century of 
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Indians, and Silver: The Northward Advance of New Spain, 1550–1600 (Berkeley,: University of 
California Press, 1952). 
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Spaniards frequently applied the term despoblado to areas they could not or did not wish to 
conquer.20  
 
Although the process of Spanish conquest reveals the intimate links between conquest and 
people, colonial and modern definitions of “conquistar” tend to emphasize the primacy of 
territorial acquisition to this process. In 1611, Sebastián de Covarrubias Orozco defined the 
term: “to acquire through force of arms a kingdom or state.”21 The eighteenth-century 
Diccionario de autoridades included a similar definition: “to subjugate, dominate, gain, or 
acquire a kingdom, province, city, or plaza, through force of arms.”22 Even the current version 
of the Diccionario de la Real Academia Española retains a territorial focus in its definition: 
“to gain, through an act of war, a territory, settlement, position, etc.”23 Although these 
definitions tend to use language that references territory, the linkage to people cannot be 
removed, and all of them reference warfare as essential to conquest. Intuitively, war requires 
an opposing side. Similarly, the Iberian concept of kingdom (reino) encompasses land and 
people. Bringing together these various strands of evidence— religious, historical, and 
semantic—Spanish conquest can be understood as the subjugation of a people and the 
territory they occupy by force of arms. 
 
Just as the Spanish concept and practice of conquest grew out of Spain’s own historical-
cultural tradition, so too did Africans have patterns and practices of warfare that offer insights 
into the applicability of the term ‘conquest’ to maroons. Unfortunately, the historic 
documentation does not allow the establishment of direct connections between the practices 
and concepts of specific African peoples and those of early maroons. While scholars of the 
African diaspora have made great strides in mapping the ethnic contours of forced African 
migration to the Americas, the documents that record the early maroons of Hispaniola rarely 
reference specific African ethnicities.24  
 
Nevertheless, certain patterns of warfare among the inhabitants of Atlantic Africa appear 
sufficiently widespread to justify their inclusion in a framework of conquest that would be 
familiar to most Africans engaged in marronage. 
 
                                                     
20.  Places deemed despoblados included the territory of the Chichimecas in northern New Spain, 
the eastern Yucatan Peninsula, and the southern deserts of Chile. Powell, Soldiers, Indians, and Silver, 
60; Matthew Restall, Maya Conquistador (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 15; Eduardo Téllez, “La guerra 
atacameña del siglo XVI: implicancias y trascendencia de un siglo de insurrecciones indígenas en el 
despoblado de Atacama,” Estudios Atacameños 7 (1984): 295–310. 
21.  Sebastián de Covarrubias Orozco, Ignacio Arellano, and Rafael Zafra, Tesoro de la lengua 
castellana o española (Madrid: Universidad de Navarra; Iberoamericana, 2006), 595. 
22.  Diccionario de autoridades: edición facsímil, 3 vols. (Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1964), 1:522. 
23.  Diccionario de la lengua española, 23rd ed. (2014), s.v. ‘conquistar,’ accessed September 9, 
2017, http://dle.rae.es. 
24.  Jane Landers has explored the relationship between ethnicity and maroon leadership. Jane 
Landers, “Leadership and Authority in Maroon Settlements in Spanish America,” in Africa and the 
Americas: Interconnections During the Slave Trade, José C. Curto and Renée Soulodre-La France, eds. 
(Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press 2005), 173–184. However, few archival documents allow scholars to 
reconstruct the overall ethnic distribution of early maroons. Only for the case of sixteenth-century 
Panama do scholars have access to extensive records documenting the range of African ethnicities 
present in maroon communities. See Tardieu, Cimarrones de Panamá, 93–103; David Wheat, Atlantic 
Africa and the Spanish Caribbean, 1570–1640 (Chapel Hill: published for the Omohundro Institute of 




The link between warfare and conquest among Atlantic African groups can be seen most 
clearly in the central role of slavery in the political economy of the region.25 Most 
importantly, Atlantic African societies generally did not recognize the private ownership of 
land. Instead, as John Thornton has argued, most African cultures relied on the control of 
people, through slavery and other forms of bondage, as the primary institution for generating 
wealth and revenue.26 Consequently, Atlantic African warfare centered on the capture and 
redistribution of labor, not the forceful acquisition of land.27 Thornton further argues that 
Atlantic African practices of enslavement through war functioned as conquest: “Just as 
slavery took the place of landed property in Africa, so slave raids were equivalent to wars of 
conquest.”28  
 
While the Spanish claimed dominion over the lands of those they conquered, African warfare 
generally relocated defeated captives to territories already controlled by the victorious side. 
The lands occupied by defeated groups were not necessarily taken by the victors.29 As a 
result, the boundaries between African states appeared quite amorphous to European 
observers since the occupation of land could shift depending on which state had the 
population sufficient to exploit a region.30 Nevertheless, the primacy of slavery to African 
warfare does not negate that expansionist states necessarily acquired territory as they came to 
control an ever larger population. The growth of the kingdom of Kongo and the Songhay 
empire both demonstrate the process by which African patterns of warfare, inexorably linked 
to slavery, resulted in territorial growth, even in a cultural region that did not prioritize private 
ownership of landed property.31 Thus, one might construe conquest in the Atlantic African 
context as the acquisition of slaves through force of arms, and at times acquisition of lands 
occupied by the conquered. 
 
The application of the term conquest to maroons follows from this discussion of Spanish and 
Atlantic African forms of conquest along interpretive and rhetorical lines. The interpretive 
argument for maroon conquests derives from the observation that maroons’ escape from 
slavery and their occupation of regions claimed by Spaniards reflects a negation of Spanish 
and Atlantic African forms of conquest. If enslavement in an Atlantic Africa was conquest, 
flight from enslavement reversed that conquest. Such a claim does not suggest that slave 
owners or the Spanish crown recognized slave flight as a means of escaping the legal status of 
slave—they, of course, did not. Nevertheless, structurally marronage could be interpreted as 
an act of ‘self-conquest,’ a reversal and negation of the original conquest by enslavement.32 
Similarly, maroon occupation of lands claimed by Spain functioned as a negation of Spanish 
                                                     
25.  Paul E. Lovejoy, “Slavery in Africa,” in The Vile Trade: Slavery and the Slave Trade in Africa, 
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servile labor including clientage, pawnship, and even serf-like bonds to land. Lovejoy, “Slavery in 
Africa,” 21–22. 
27.  John K. Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500–1800 (London; New York: UCL Press, 
1999), 16–17; Richard J. Reid, Warfare in African History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 5. 
28.  Thornton, Africa and Africans, 102. 
29.  Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 17. 
30.  Thornton, Africa and Africans, 105–106. 
31.  Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 133–139. 
32.  Neil Roberts, Freedom as Marronage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 13. In his 
examination of the intellectual and philosophical relationship between freedom and marronage, Roberts 
posited that “Marronage is a total refusal of the enslaved condition.” 
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claims to conquest. Spaniards claimed dominion over American lands by virtue of the 
conquest of their original inhabitants. By occupying lands, and defending those lands by force 
of arms, maroons negated earlier Spanish conquests. 
 
More importantly, having negated the conquests that had enslaved them and the conquest that 
had established Spanish claims to land, maroons engaged in activities consistent with Atlantic 
African forms of conquest. Maroons regularly raided Spanish estates and communities to free 
other slaves and acquire resources. Such raids removed laborers from the control of Spanish 
slave owners and added them to the maroon community. Although maroons do not appear to 
have enslaved those they captured, the transfer of labor from one group to another through 
raids mirrors African practices. Some Spanish accounts claimed that maroons raided and 
enslaved neighboring indigenous groups.33 Such a practice would be consistent with Atlantic 
African warfare; nevertheless, Spanish stereotypes of Africans as violent and oppressive may 
have influenced their observations that maroons enslaved native people.34 The use of raids to 
deprive enemies of labor and resources represents an enduring feature of African conquest 
and warfare that maroons adapted to their needs in the Americas.35  
 
Moving from the interpretive to the rhetorical, the application of the term “conquest” to 
maroon actions on Hispaniola serves to underscore the significance of the maroons’ actions in 
rejecting their enslavement and commodification in the Atlantic slave trade and opposing 
Spanish colonialism. If the Spanish conceived of at least some anti-maroon campaigns as 
conquests, they also tacitly acknowledged that maroons had used force of arms to establish 
and defend dominion over the lands they occupied. Rhetorically, recognizing that maroons 
could engage in conquests serves to decouple the notion of conquest in the Americas from an 
exclusively Spanish-European mode. Maroons certainly did not conquer in the way that 
Spaniards did. Drawing from African traditions, their connection to land could be transitory. 
Maroon communities and the lands they occupied shifted as their needs changed and as 
Spanish anti-maroon campaigns threatened their livelihood. Moreover, maroon conquests 
could be ephemeral and short-lived. In the discussion that follows one can identify a pattern 
of repeated maroon conquests on Hispaniola, but outside of the region of the Bahoruco few 
maroon communities lasted for prolonged periods. For most of the sixteenth century, 
Spaniards fought against maroons, regularly capturing, killing, and dispersing specific groups. 
Yet, even when Spaniards claimed victory, they rarely succeeded in capturing or killing all 
the maroons they encountered. Those who remained, joined by a constant trickle of runaway 
slaves, re-formed communities that occupied new spaces on the landscape, threatened Spanish 
interests, and became targets for renewed Spanish campaigns of conquest. 
 
Yet, while maroon conquests draw our attention to the actions and choices of maroons as 
counter-conquistadors and conquerors, their experiences cannot be rendered as a triumphalist 
narrative of success. Maroons and their communities experienced perilous material conditions 
and were the target of near-constant military campaigns by determined and better armed 
adversaries. Many died or faced a return to slavery when the campaigns against them 
succeeded. In short, even if understood as conquerors, maroons faced uncertain futures and a 
                                                     
33.  For example, in the 1580s Fray Pedro de Aguado asserted that the maroons of Panama’s 
Bayano held an entire indigenous community in subjugation. Pedro de Aguado, Recopilación historial 
de Venezuela, 2 vols. (Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1963), 2:611–612. 
34.  Claims like Aguado’s stand in contrast to African and indigenous cooperation in the region. 
Guillot, Negros rebeldes y negros cimarrones, 139; Ruth Pike, “Black Rebels: The Cimarrons of 
Sixteenth-Century Panama,” The Americas 64:2 (2007): 246; Tardieu, Cimarrones de Panamá, 95–96; 
Wheat, Atlantic Africa and the Spanish Caribbean, 57. 
35.  Reid, Warfare in African History, 7. 
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constant struggle for survival. Cognizant of the perilous position of maroons and their 
communities, this article offers a reappraisal of early African maroons on Hispaniola, 
demonstrating that early Spanish colonialism, with its reliance on African labor and the 
transatlantic slave trade, directly contributed to a pattern of African conquest in the Americas, 
and that their conquests in turn rendered Spanish conquest efforts inadequate and incomplete. 
Thus, while maroon communities grew out of colonial relationships, they are nothing less 
than sites of African conquest. 
 
 
THE INDIGENOUS MAROONS 
 
The formation of the Bahoruco, Hispaniola’s largest and most stable maroon enclave, typifies 
the processes of maroon communities and conquest. Prior to the Spanish arrival on the island, 
the indigenous inhabitants were governed by hereditary rulers or caciques whose claim to 
leadership was intimately tied to their ancestral lands, often termed cacicazgos.36 At the time 
of the Spanish arrival, the Bahoruco fell within the cacicazgo of Maguana forming a frontier 





Indigenous Cacicazgos of Hispaniola and Spanish Campaigns of Conquest, 1493–1503 
 
 
Source: Locations of cacicazgos following “Cacicazgos” in Frank Moya Pons, Manual de 




Until 1503, most early Spanish-indigenous conflict occurred in the cacicazgos of Maguana 
and Magua.37 During this time Spanish settlement expanded along a north-south axis through 
the center of the island. After defeating the indigenous leaders of these regions, Spaniards 
                                                     
36.  William F. Keegan, Taíno Indian Myth and Practice: The Arrival of the Stranger King, Ripley 
P. Bullen Series (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), 93–123. 
37.  Erin Woodruff Stone, “Indian Harvest: The Rise of the Indigenous Slave Trade and Diaspora 
from Española to the Circum-Caribbean, 1492–1542” (PhD diss.: Vanderbilt University 2014), 72–78. 
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imposed the institution of the encomienda on defeated indigenous communities, often 
relocating them closer to Spanish settlements. These disruptions allowed the cacique of 
Xaragua to annex the Bahoruco from the cacicazgo of Maguana.38 In July of 1503, the 
island’s governor, Nicolás de Ovando, initiated a new series of campaigns that targeted the 
cacicazgos of Higüey, Marien, and Xaragua.39 After defeating Anacaona, the cacica of 
Xaragua, Ovando consolidated the indigenous residents of the cacicazgo in the town of Santa 
Maria de la Vera Paz.40 Enrique, the grandnephew of Anacaona and a future maroon leader, 
spent his youth at the settlement of Vera Paz. In 1514, Spanish authorities initiated a 
widespread program of indigenous relocation that reassigned indigenous communities to new 
Spanish encomenderos in an attempt to accommodate the labor demands of the remaining 
gold mines and the burgeoning sugar industry.41 This program weakened the indigenous elites 
by removing them from their ancestral cacicazgos and emptied wide swaths of the island. As 
part of this plan, Enrique and his people were relocated from Vera Paz to San Juan de 
Maguana and distributed among Spanish encomenderos.42  
 
In emptying previously conquered areas, this plan transformed conquered lands controlled 
through Spanish and indigenous communities into unoccupied territories devoid of Spanish 
settlement and oversight. The community of Vera Paz soon disappeared; its few Spanish 
inhabitants relocated westward, to a harbor known as Yaguana.43 Consequently, from around 
1515 onward Spanish control of the former cacicazgo of Xaragua rested solely in the 
communities of San Juan de Maguana, Yaguana, and Azua, a port on the eastern edge of the 
region. The rugged terrain of the Bahoruco lay vacant and beyond the immediate interests of 
Spanish authorities and settlers. In 1519, tensions between Enrique and his encomendero led 
the indigenous leader to flee the encomienda with 30 to 40 followers. The indigenous 
maroons’ greater knowledge of the region allowed them to evade capture and reestablish a 
self-sufficient community in a region they knew intimately. For more than ten years, Spanish 
forces repeatedly failed to conquer the Bahoruco or capture Enrique.44  
 
By the 1520s, the geopolitical balance on the island had begun to shift. Spanish settlement and 
exploitation concentrated in coastal sugar regions and along the north-south corridor of 
settlements established in the 1490s. This geographic clustering of Spaniards, along with their 
slaves and indigenous encomiendas, created space for maroons, first indigenous and then 
African, to seek out vacant territory and establish communities.45 Enrique’s community 
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became the first of many maroon communities that would carve out territories across the 
island. During the 1530’s, the Bahoruco remained the primary refuge for maroons, including 
increasing numbers of Africans. In 1533, negotiations with Enrique bore fruit and the 
Bahoruco maroon problem appeared open to a solution. Enrique and many of his indigenous 
followers agreed to surrender and in return were allowed to establish their own self-governing 
community about 20 miles from Azua.46 Yet, in relocating Enrique’s community, the Spanish 
authorities once again left the Bahoruco devoid of Spanish subjects. Almost immediately, new 
waves of African maroons flocked into the region to establish communities. 
 
 
THE RISE OF AFRICAN MAROONS (1530 TO 1540s) 
 
Across the island, a similar pattern emerged as maroons, mostly runaway African slaves, 





Areas of African Maroon Activity on Hispaniola, 1520s–1550s 
 
Source: Areas of sugar production following “Areas de producción de caña de azúcar (siglo 
XVI)” in Moya Pons, Manual de historia dominicana, n.p. Map by author. 
 
 
In 1532, the Audiencia of Santo Domingo warned that indigenous maroons had established a 
community near Puerto Real.47 Ten years later, the archdeacon Álvaro de Castro reported that 
between 2000 and 3000 African maroons were occupying Cabo San Nicolás, Ciguayos, the 
Samaná peninsula, and the cape of Higüey.48 For their part, the audiencia lamented that the 
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townspeople (vecinos) of La Vega, Puerto de Plata, and Santiago dared not leave their homes, 
and that the region’s miners slept with their lances out of fear of maroon raids.49 Another 
report from this period claimed that various bands of maroons wandered the entire northern 
cordillera from Santiago to Montecristi.50 During his stay on the island in 1545, the Milanese 
conquistador and chronicler Girolamo Benzoni estimated that the island housed 7000 
maroons.51 Although hyperbolic, Benzoni’s account appears to reflect widespread fears of the 
maroon presence on the island. 
 
The explosion in the number of African maroons during this period reflects two 
interdependent trends. First, the focus of Spanish exploitation of the island had begun to 
change, from mining to sugar.52 This led to the abandonment of many settlements and the 
consolidation of Spaniards, natives, and Africans in a handful of sites. Second, the indigenous 
population continued to decline as more and more African slaves arrived on the island.53 As 
slaves began to recognize the limits of Spanish territorial control, resistance through flight, 
individual or collective, fueled the growth of maroon communities. 
 
Numerous and widespread groups of maroons severely disrupted Spanish commerce and 
trade. By the 1540s, the maroons of the Bahoruco had effectively cut off the overland road 
connecting the port of Yaguana to San Juan de Maguana.54 In 1543, Melchor de Castro, the 
escribano de minas, noted that the maroons had occupied the depopulated interior of the 
island, where they survived on the wild cattle and boar found there.55 Some reports even noted 
that the maroons’ control of the interior and its roadways had become so decisive that 
Spaniards traveled only in groups as large as 15 to 20.56  
 
In addition to controlling these rural resources, maroons established their own commercial 
networks connecting maroon communities to each other and to Africans still living in Spanish 
communities. In his letter of 1542, Archdeacon Castro lamented that maroons conspired with 
urban slaves, especially women termed ganadoras, to sell stolen goods back to Spanish cities. 
By 1545, Spanish officials feared that maroons could take the entire island if they chose. 
During this era, several maroon leaders gained notoriety for their exploits. Spanish officials 
regularly lamented the attacks undertaken by Diego Ocampo, Diego de Guzmán, and 
Sebastián Lemba. 
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These men and their followers generally operated in specific areas. For example, Lemba 
appeared to use the Bahoruco as his primary sanctuary, while Diego de Guzmán roved near la 
Vega. Nevertheless, they often raided across the island, relying on equestrian skills to travel 
great distances. Oidor Alonso de Grajeda noted: “The great part of their vigor comes from 
their having been raised among the cattle herds of the vecinos of this island, where they ride 
on horseback and become brazen and skilled in the saddle as with the lance.57 Of these 
leaders, Diego Ocampo appears to have used this mobility to greatest effect. His raids took 
him from La Vega to Azua, then into the Bahoruco. From the Bahoruco he and his men raided 
San Juan de la Maguana and Azua, moving back to La Vega and then to Puerto Plata.58 The 
ease with which Ocampo moved across the island demonstrates the inability of Spanish 
officials to control roadways and rural areas. Moreover, the scope of maroon activities during 
this time speaks to their successful conquests in the island’s interior. Not only did maroons 
control various enclaves, but they were able to use these enclaves as bases from to challenge 
Spanish interests far and wide. 
 
Over the next few years, the Spanish-maroon balance would shift once again. After arriving 
on the island in 1543, the new president of the audiencia, Alonso López de Cerrato, 
commissioned two squads of Spaniards charged with capturing or killing maroons. This 
strategy replicated a policy first established in 1528 as part of an expansive set of slave codes 
created to stem the tide of African resistance.59 The two squads attempted to reestablish 
Spanish authority outside of Hispaniola’s beleaguered cities. In 1545, the king authorized the 
audiencia to entertain the possibility of negotiation with maroons, which further expanded the 
options available to local authorities.60  
 
Within a year, López de Cerrato’s roving patrols bore fruit. In 1546, two maroon leaders, 
Diego Ocampo and Diego de Guzmán both approached Spanish authorities and sued for their 
freedom.61 Ocampo negotiated his surrender via a resident of Puerto Plata. 
 
Ocampo’s knowledge of possible pardons and his choice to approach a Spaniard in Puerto 
Plata to negotiate for him suggests that maroons’ networks of communication not only 
crisscrossed the geographic space of the island but connected them to Spanish cities and 
estates. Unlike Enrique’s negotiated surrender of his entire community, Ocampo requested 
freedom only for himself, his wife, and two cousins.62 Nevertheless, as had Enrique, he agreed 
to work alongside Spaniards as a slave catcher. Soon after, Diego de Guzmán followed suit, 
negotiating a personal pardon and agreeing to combat maroons on behalf of the Spanish.63 
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López de Cerrato informed the crown that Spanish residents felt great contentment after 
recruiting Ocampo.64  
 
These surrenders followed several major victories by Spanish authorities against maroon 
bands. After a series of engagements around San Juan de Maguana, a Spanish force described 
as “a grand squad” succeeded in capturing or killing more than 100 maroons. The Spanish 
imposed severe penalties on the maroons they defeated, executing some, amputating the limbs 
of others, and exiling women and children from the island.65 These strategies did not eradicate 
the maroon presence in the hinterlands, although they did suppress maroon raids of Spanish 
estates. Importantly, the new squads focused on patrolling the island’s roads and providing a 
fast- reaction force to reports of maroon raids. By late 1546, African maroon-catchers, like 
Ocampo and Guzmán, were supporting these squads. Spanish authorities offered freedom to 
slaves that served with distinction in these campaigns. In October 1547, the oidors López de 
Cerrato and Grajeda credited these new African allies with suppressing the maroons active 
around la Vega and Santiago.66 Similarly, the new mixed units helped reduce a maroon 
settlement near Higüey that possibly had existed for more than 15 years.67  
 
Nonetheless, the remote Bahoruco remained a haven for maroons. From 1546 to 1548 the 
maroon leader Sebastián Lemba used the region as a base for raids on Spanish estates near 
San Juan de Maguana and Azua. After evading Spanish patrols for the better part of a year, 
Lemba was cornered and successfully defeated in September of 1548 by a Spanish-African 
squad. In their report, the oidors noted that the killing blow had been dealt by a slave ally, 
who thereby received his freedom and a license to bear arms.68 The defeat of Lemba appeared 
to signal an end to maroon activity on the island. In January of 1549, the audiencia reported 
that “this matter of negro rebels has now been completely settled, this has been a great boon 
for the island and for the other [slaves] who now know they cannot rise up.”69  
 
There is reason to question the audiencia’s elation over the apparent pacification of maroons. 
Earlier reports had placed maroons in Cabo San Nicolás, Ciguayos, the Samaná peninsula, 
and the entire northern cordillera, regions peripheral to the anti-maroon operations of the 
1540s. The most contentious conflicts occurred in the region bounded by Santo Domingo, San 
Juan de Maguana, La Vega, and extending northeast to Puerto Plata. Spanish squads 
responded to threats as they appeared and entered the hinterlands only while in pursuit. 
Except for the destruction of the community located in Higüey, none of the squads’ reports 
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describe efforts to destroy established maroon communities. Finally, even though the reports 
of 1545–49 clearly indicate that Spanish tactics had suppressed maroon raids, the number of 
maroons caught or killed during this period pales in comparison to the number of suspected 
maroons reported in the early 1540s. While those numbers may have been exaggerated, the 
limited territorial range of Spanish patrols, the mobility of maroons, and the continued 
existence of vast regions devoid of Spanish development suggest that by 1550 maroons had 
not been eradicated but had likely gravitated away from areas of intense Spanish conflict. 
 
Official reports corroborate a period of maroon retrenchment. In July 1549, Oidor Grajeda 
reported that only a small band of eight to ten maroons moved around the Bahoruco, “without 
harming anyone.”70 Interestingly, in the same letter, Grajeda noted that in La Vega a band of 
20 to 25 indios cimarrones had taken up operations under the leadership of an indigenous 
captain and a black man named Dieguillo Ocampo, possibly the same maroon who had 
negotiated a pardon three years earlier. 
 
 
AN INTERLUDE OF DEPOPULATION, CATTLE, AND CONTRABAND 
 
During the middle decades of the sixteenth century, the island of Hispaniola underwent 
significant demographic and economic changes. Simultaneously, the island faced new 
pressure in the form of foreign interlopers seeking to establish a foothold there. While many 
of these changes occurred independently from the maroon wars of the period, they 
increasingly destabilized Spanish colonial authority and furthered the process of undoing 
Spanish conquests. Collectively, these changes and pressures, in combination with a renewal 
of maroon activity in the last third of the century, would lead colonial authorities to 
voluntarily cede all pretense of colonial dominion by ordering the destruction of Spanish 
communities and estates in the north and west of the island. 
 
At its peak in the 1510s, the island was home to 10,000 Spaniards.71 From the 1520s onward, 
the island’s population decreased dramatically. As the gold boom subsided, the native 
population declined, and new conquests lured adventurous men away, many early settlements 
on the island disappeared. Between 1514 and the early 1520s, six settlements were 
abandoned, and only one founded.72 By the 1540s, the peak of early maroon conflict, the 
island’s Spanish population likely numbered around 4,500.73 Spanish settlement concentrated 
primarily in Santo Domingo with significantly smaller clusters in the various towns and villas 
located near the coast. From the 1540s through the end of the century, the overall Spanish 
population remained largely static, growing slowly to around 6,000 in 1606.74  
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Africans bolstered the sparse Spanish population. In 1542, the island held as many as 30,000 
slaves.75 While this number might be exaggerated, it would not be unreasonable to assume 
that African slaves numbered between 10,000 and 20,000 in the 1540s.76 For most of the 
sixteenth century, Africans dominated the sugar-producing region stretching from Santo 
Domingo west toward Azua and San Juan de Maguana. The slave population peaked at mid 
century, and began to decline during its final decades. In 1568, Oidor Juan Echagoian 
reported a total slave population of 20,000.77 In 1571, the chronicler Juan López de Velasco 
claimed the island had just over 12,000.78 Following a smallpox epidemic in 1586, the number 
of slaves dropped further, to below 10,000 by 1606.79 The decline in the number of slaves can 
be further attributed to the slowing of the sugar economy and the island’s increasing isolation 
from major commercial routes. 
 
By mid century, sugarcane dominated the island’s economy. However, sugar estates required 
large expenditures for both constant upkeep to their infrastructure, especially the mills, and 
capital to purchase slaves.80 From the 1550s onward, changes in trading patterns slowed the 
economy and made import and export difficult. As sugar struggled, new industries developed, 
most notably livestock production and ginger. Ranching entrepreneurs used slave labor to 
produce hides for export. Over time, the increasingly depopulated interior of the island 
became home to thousands of heads of livestock.81 Between 1565 and 1574, the cultivation of 
imported ginger root took hold. Ginger proved a boon for the struggling island; more valuable 
than sugar by weight, it required less capital outlay and could be produced with slave labor.82 
During the last quarter of the century, many Spanish entrepreneurs shifted into ginger 
production and the island even sought to establish an empire-wide monopoly on its 
production.83 Despite the shifts toward livestock and ginger, effective export to European 
markets was limited by changing trade patterns and foreign threats. 
 
As early as the 1520s, English and French ships had begun to enter the region in the hopes of 
capturing Spanish ships and their precious cargo. During the 1530s and 1540s, war with 
France led to the capture of more than 60 Spanish trading vessels in the Atlantic, more than 
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17 of those taken in the Antilles.84 The frequency of interlopers’ assaults increased 
dramatically from the 1560s through the 1590s.85 Not content with capturing trading vessels 
at sea, pirates, including Francis Drake, John Hawkins, and John Oxenham, conducted daring 
raids against Spanish cities, ports, and fleets. In 1586, Drake successfully sacked Santo 
Domingo and occupied it for a month, receiving a ransom of 25,000 ducats and stockpiled 
hides, sugar, and other exports.86 English privateers predominated during open wars between 
Spain and England from 1585 through 1604. After 1600, French and Dutch interlopers rose in 
prominence.87  
 
In response to foreign incursions, the king established a new system of convoys (flotas) that 
would protect merchant vessels to and from the Americas. This system mandated that 
commercial vessels travel with commissioned military escorts for protection.88 From the 
1540s through the 1570s, the flota operated irregularly.89 By the 1570s, the flota became 
regularized, escorting merchants into Caribbean through the Lesser Antilles and on to their 
destinations before reuniting the fleet in Havana for a return voyage. The flota system tended 
to sideline Santo Domingo for several reasons. First, the Seville consulado (merchants’ guild) 
regulated the outfitting of ships, their cargoes, and their destinations.90 Second, the desire to 
trade European goods for silver specie resulted in most trading vessels departing for the 
silver-exporting ports of the mainland. This meant that ships bound for Santo Domingo had to 
travel for some of their journey outside the safety of the larger flota and its military escorts. 
Third, by the 1580s, the timing of the fleet’s arrival and departure did not correlate to that of 
the ginger harvest, meaning that merchants often had to ship green ginger, much of which 
spoiled en route.91 Although the flota system made shipping safer, fewer ships frequented 
Hispaniola. 
 
As Hispaniola became more peripheral to the empire’s trading patterns, the continued 
presence of foreign ships led to mutually beneficial, albeit illegal, contraband trade. On 
Hispaniola, most contraband was transferred along the banda del norte (the northern coast), 
which included the ports of Bayahá, Montecristi, and Puerto Plata.92 Illicit trade in the region 
involved locals desperate to sell goods outside the highly regulated and infrequent flota 
system.93 Royal officials considered contraband trade to be the most pernicious problem on 
the island. Not only did the trade bypass royal taxation and trade monopolies, but it 
encouraged the continued presence of foreign interlopers in the region and exposed Catholic 
subjects to Protestant heresy. During the last quarter of the century, contraband trade grew to 
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the point that officials and observers began to consider the drastic step of forcibly 





For several decades following the maroon campaigns of the 1540s, maroon activity remained 
subdued. However, Spaniards did not attempt to reclaim the vast stretches of the island they 
controlled, and various reports from this period afford glimpses into the continuing 
perseverance of maroons throughout the island. In 1554, Lorenzo Bernáldez reported finding 
maroon bands composed of negros and indios near Nagua.94 In 1566, the audiencia reported 
that negros cimarrones had been reported wandering close to Santo Domingo.95 In 1571, the 
king authorized the conquest of a “pueblo de negros huidos” located about 36 miles from the 
capital.96 Although reports remained sparse, earlier patterns reemerged: the audiencia 
reiterated the close connection between maroons and the urban population of free and 
enslaved negros.97 Officials lamented that the presence of maroons in the hinterlands 
emboldened slaves and contributed to slave flight and unrest.98  
 
In response to maroon activity, Spanish officials continued to mobilize regular patrols of 
roads and hinterlands. By the 1560s, the patrols, once an ad hoc solution, had become a 
permanent policy. The cost of these patrols fell on the Spanish residents, with new taxes on 
taverns, wine, and wheat proposed to raise the funds necessary to pay for their operation.99 In 
1565, the city of Santo Domingo asked for and received royal authorization for the creation of 
“alcaldes visitadores de negros.” These magistrates were charged with visiting slave estates 
to insure that masters were not inciting slaves to unrest or marronage through excessive 
cruelty or inattention.100 Although active conflicts remained limited, Spanish policies suggest 
that the maroon communities continued to pose a threat to Spanish interests. 
 
During the last quarter century, Spanish-maroon conflict became more frequent and more 
intense. The long-standing sanctuary of the Bahoruco featured prominently in these renewed 
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Areas of African Maroon Activity on Hispaniola, 1570s–1610s 
 
Source: Limits of Spanish settlement following “Devastaciones (1605–1606)” in Moya Pons, 
Manual de historia dominicana, n.p. Map by author. 
 
 
In 1578, the president of the audiencia warned that the region had taken in so many runaways 
that it had become troublesome to manage.101 Oidor Aliaga estimated its size at 300 vecinos 
and growing.102 By 1585, President Cristóbal de Ovalle warned that the community was 
becoming too temerarious and threatening surrounding areas.103 In December 1585, a maroon 
named Pedro Criollo raised a force of 70 slaves from a sugar mill near Cazui and began a 
march on Santo Domingo.104 Only through the timely intervention of a Spanish resident 
named Diego Caballero Bazán was the uprising put down. Caballero Bazán and 11 other 
Spaniards broke the uprising, but failed to capture Pedro, who remained at large with an 
unknown number of survivors.105 Although it was thus saved from a widespread slave 
rebellion, the capital city would be sacked and occupied by Francis Drake only days later. 
 
Drake’s successful attack appears to have increased the Spanish fears of fighting enemies “by 
sea and by land.” The island’s authorities may have been aware of Drake’s earlier exploits 
among maroons on the Isthmus of Panama and feared future maroon alliances with foreign 
interlopers.106 The cabildo of Santo 
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Domingo knew enough about events in Panama to request that the king authorize it to pursue 
a negotiated peace with the islands’ maroons, to be modeled after one used to pacify maroons 
in that region.107 Nevertheless, calls for military expeditions increased in the years that 
followed. In March 1587, the cabildo of Yaguana painted a bleak picture of the maroons’ 
control of the Bahoruco and their ability to disrupt Spanish communities on the island: 
 
On this island there have rebelled various negros and there are many now and their numbers 
have grown such that they have made a settlement or settlements called the Bahoruco, where 
we have received word that there are a large number of people. Every day they come to the 
mills and steal negros, some are taken by force, others go willingly. They even communicate 
secretly with negros mansos. They continue building up and fortifying themselves, having so 
much temerity and imprudence that they now come to take us from our homes without our 
being able to resist them.108  
 
The lure of the Bahoruco stretched farther than Spaniards in Yaguana may have realized. In 
1590, slaves fleeing the pearl fisheries on Margarita reportedly planned to use their canoes to 
reach the safety of the Bahoruco.109 The reputation of the Bahoruco as a refuge for runaway 
slaves had spread almost a thousand miles across the Caribbean. These growing fears led to 
action. Between 1592 and 1598, the Spanish made at least four entradas (armed expeditions) 
into the region.110 Although the two governors during this period praised the campaigns, the 
surviving documentation does not indicate how many maroons were encountered, killed, or 
recaptured. Interestingly, Antonio de Ovalle, the captain of the first two entradas, succeeded 
in convincing several slaves to surrender in return for their freedom, provided they resettled 
themselves at the former site of San Juan de Maguana.111 In return for his service, Ovalle 
received the community as a corregimiento (a district under Spanish rule) with an income of 
100,000 maravedís. This community appears to have remained coherent through 1606, when 
it numbered 25. 
 
 
MAROONS AND THE DEVASTACIONES DE OSORIO 
 
As the new century dawned, efforts to prevent contraband trade reignited and even expanded 
the territorial conflict between Spaniards and maroons. Just as renewed campaigns swept 
through the Bahoruco, royal officials on the island initiated a series of intense investigations 
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into contraband trade. In 1594 and 1595, these investigations resulted in scores of convictions 
against some of the most prominent figures in the colony.112 To curb the widespread, endemic 
contraband, royal officials considered extreme measures. Since at least 1573, the king had 
received proposals for relocating communities along the banda del norte to prevent 
contraband trade.113 The final shape of such a policy appears to have come from two long 
missives sent by the audiencia’s escribano de cámara (clerk of the court), Baltasar López de 
Castro, in 1598. 
 
The letters detailed a program for relocating the residents of the contraband ports of Bayaha, 
Puerto Plata, and Yaguana to the interior near Santo Domingo.114 Initially the proposals were 
ignored, but following the ascension of Phillip III the Council of the Indies moved to 
implement them.115 In 1603, a series of royal cédulas commissioned the newly appointed 
governor of the island, Antonio de Osorio, to undertake the plan proposed by López de 
Castro. Most scholars have rightly emphasized that this project primarily targeted contraband 
trade.116 Notably, but unremarked by scholars, López de Castro’s recommendations also 
considered the island’s maroons as justification for the policy. 
 
In his first letter, López de Castro mused that as contraband traders became more aware of the 
island’s inhabitants they would make allies of the maroons. He claimed that with only the aid 
of the Bahoruco the entire island could be taken.117 In his second letter, López de Castro 
emphasized that the remoteness of the communities in the banda del norte put them at risk of 
attack by both corsairs and “the negro slaves who wish to rebel and make themselves lords of 
[the communities].”118 López de Castro went on to recount a long history of maroon leaders, 
including Juan Vaquero, Lemba, and Juan Criollo, before proposing that relocated 
communities would be better able to defend against corsairs and negros because they could 
unite their Spanish residents more quickly in an emergency. Many contemporary opponents of 
this policy noted astutely that such a dislocation would actually benefit Spain’s enemies, 
opening up the coast and interior to both foreigners and maroons.119 Despite local opposition, 
Osorio proceeded with the depopulation, which would become known as the Devastaciones 
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de Osorio, and in so doing opened the island to new waves of maroon conquest and 
settlement. 
 
Foreshadowing the future course of events, the cabildo of Santo Domingo wrote to the king in 
1604, vehemently objecting to the implementation of the plan. They opined that some slaves 
in the banda del norte would use the disruption to stay in the region and continue the 
contraband trade, while others would flee to seek liberty in the depopulated lands.120 These 
fears came to be realized as soon as Osorio enacted the depopulation. In January 1605, Osorio 
informed the king that a group of citizens from Bayaha had refused to relocate and had 
fortified themselves in the valley of Guaba. He warned that this group of Spanish rebels could 
be joined by the negros “who regularly run away.”121 In August 1605, Osorio reported that 
between 60 and 70 slaves had fled to the banda del norte, where they supported themselves by 
raising livestock on hidden ranches and trading hides with foreign ships, and enjoyed the 
liberty they desired.122 This report likely underestimates the number of slaves who used these 
dislocations to their advantage by seeking freedom in newly vacated areas. One cannot forget 
that slaves from the banda del norte knew the region and its resources, and may have already 
had contact with maroons living in nearby communities. 
 
To address resistance by Africans and Spaniards, Osorio expanded the practice of sending out 
roving patrols. By mid 1606, at least three patrols scoured the banda del norte. One operated 
between Yaguana and San Juan de Maguana, another between Yaguana and Guaba, and a 
third roamed the areas between Bayaha, Montecristi, and Puerto Plata. In the month of 
September 1606, Osorio documented the capture of nearly 70 slaves, of whom 46 were 
captured by the patrol roving along the western coastline between Yaguana and Bayaha.123 By 
October 1606, five squads comprised of 200 soldiers scoured the banda del norte.124 Over the 
winter, these patrols captured more than 150 slaves and executed more than 30 contraband 
traders.125 Osorio’s successor, Diego Gómez de Sandoval, maintained four squads totaling 
200 men, through at least 1610.126 These squads appear to have focused on the coast, regularly 
checking the ports frequented by foreign ships and contraband traders. When maroons were 
reported, existing patrols were dispatched, or ad hoc squads deployed.127 For example, in mid 
1609, a 40-man squad patrolled the far side of the salvarayas (line of demarcation) with 
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orders to execute maroons who resisted and return those who surrendered peacefully to their 
owners (see Figure 3).128  
 
In the years following the Devastaciones de Osorio, encounters between these patrols and 
maroons revealed an island abounding in maroons, some living in long-standing sanctuaries, 
others in communities newly formed by the depopulation. In 1607, Osorio reported an 
expedition to capture a mixed group of “hombres blancos y negros” who had fled to the island 
of Tortuga. Members of this band later fled from Tortuga to Cabo San Nicolás, where some 
were captured and taken to Santiago de Cuba.129 In 1608, the newly arrived governor Diego 
Gómez de Sandoval complained that the Bahoruco served “as a cave for thieves and for 
collecting [slaves] that flee this city.”130 The description of the region as a cave may reference 
the maroons’ strategy of using caves as hideouts, a practice that appears to have Taino 
roots.131  
 
In late 1608, Oidor Villalobos investigated reports of a sizable maroon population near Puerto 
Plata. A squad sent to explore the countryside discovered a settlement numbering more than 
30 persons, with huts and cultivated fields of yucca, banana, sweet potatoes, corn, rice, beans, 
tobacco, and cotton.132 After a brief battle, the squad captured ten of the 30 or so residents.133 
Similarly, in late 1610, a patrol led by Captain Esteban Peguero stumbled across a community 
of more than 70 maroons in the Sierra de la Cabuyas, about 20 miles from Santo Domingo. 
The discovery occurred one evening after sunset, when Peguero “heard the drumming of the 
Angolans’ dances followed by those of the creoles’ dances.”134 Once alerted, the patrol 
entered a settlement they found to be at least 30 years old, complete with homes, fields, and 
corrals for keeping pigs. After a brief engagement, Peguero succeeded in negotiating an 
agreement with the community’s leaders. The two leaders, a creole and an Angolan, would be 
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freed, along with their wives. The remaining residents were obliged to return to their previous 
owners and promised that would be treated well; if not, they could be granted a license from 
the governor to be sold to new masters. These arrangements secured the surrender of 64 of the 
community’s 76 residents, nine maroons chose to flee. The others did not fare well: despite 
his promises, Gómez de Sandoval ordered that the newly surrendered maroons be sold off the 
island. 
 
In 1611, the capture of a French sailor, Guillermo Pereya, revealed the location of a maroon 
community on Cabo Tiburón in the far west of the island. Interviewed personally by Gómez 
de Sandoval, Pereya recounted a harrowing tale that wove together piracy, contraband, and 
maroons.135 After Pereyra left Le Havre in 1606, an English ship attacked and captured his 
ship taking the crew prisoner. For more than a year, Pereya lived as a prisoner of the English. 
Eventually, the English abandoned him on Hispaniola, near Cabo Tiburón. There he 
encountered four maroons who took him to their community. For four years he lived among 
50 maroons, who managed wild livestock in the region, tanned hides, and salted pork. 
Sometime in early 1611, two English ships and a Dutch vessel visited Cabo Tiburón to trade. 
In return for 200 hides and salt pork, the maroons received ten muskets, powder, shot, cord, 
lances, Rouen cloth, canvas, knives, thread, and 23 slaves who had been stolen from a 
Portuguese slave vessel. Pereya convinced one of the English captains to take him aboard. 
After more changes of fortune, Pereya found himself aboard a Spanish vessel bound for Santo 
Domingo, where he testified to his experiences. In response, Gómez de Sandoval sent patrols 
to conquer the maroon settlement on Cabo Tiburón. The efforts continued through 1612 and 
resulted in the capture of more than 40 maroons, suggesting that between 20 and 30 remained 
at large.136  
 
After the flurry of anti-maroon activity between 1610 and 1612, Spanish-maroon conflicts 
diminished from 1613 through the end of Gómez de Sandoval’s tenure. In 1622, Gómez de 
Sandoval submitted a long información de oficio y parte in which his anti-maroon activities 
featured prominently. He claimed personal credit for Captain Peguero’s successful campaign, 
but he did not mention the entradas made in Cabo Tiburón. His recounting included reference 
to several campaigns undocumented in his official correspondence. Most notably, he claimed 
to have personally led a campaign into the mountains of the Bahoruco at great personal cost. 
Although he made much of the hardships of a 40-day expedition, he and his men managed to 
kill only five maroons and capture eight, a somewhat meager result for a region that had held 
at least 500 maroons prior to the dislocations and marronage caused by the devastaciones. 
Gómez de Sandoval also claimed credit for recovering more than 50 runaway slaves from 
scattered settlements located on the Río Ozama; near the source of the Río Yuna; on the Río 
Baní; on the Río Casuí; near the settlement of Seibo; and on the arroyo hondo near the 
settlement of Higuey, among others. As with his claims for the Bahoruco, 50 seems a modest 
number, given the many settlements listed. Moreover, all the sites mentioned were located 
within the boundaries established after the devastaciones. The clustering of these sites 
suggests that after the anti-maroon activities of 1606–12, continuing operations had turned 
inward, ignoring the banda del norte beyond the salvarayas and focusing on the territories that 
now constituted the Spanish colony. 
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Overall, the island during the first quarter of the seventeenth century seemed a bifurcated 
colony. In the wake of the devastaciones, Spanish settlement and economic interests had 
further consolidated in the interior and along the southeastern coast. Royal law and the 
island’s officials enforced this isolation under penalty of death. The west and north of the 
island sat officially depopulated and off limits. In these areas, and remote parts of the east, a 
constant trickle of African runaways joined long-resident maroons living in isolated 
settlements. In the Bahoruco such communities likely numbered in the hundreds. Elsewhere, 
evidence suggests that communities of several dozen to several score had carved out spaces in 
the landscape. Importantly, many of these settlements appear to have sustained themselves by 
cultivation of diverse agricultural goods and the pastoral management of wild European 
livestock. By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, many of Hispaniola’s 
maroons appear to have eschewed raiding of Spanish settlements and commerce, opting 
instead to pursue quiet isolation far from the eyes of Spanish officials. 
 
The apparent cooling of open Spanish-maroon conflict after 1612 likely reflects the 
establishment of a new norm. Spanish officials maintained patrols, although these appear to 
have focused more on pursing runaway slaves than hunting down remote maroon 
settlements.137 Those maroons who continued to inhabit the Bahoruco and other remote 
communities faced periodic but largely ineffective campaigns of suppression.138 Those that 
remained beyond the salvarayas would soon find themselves increasingly caught up in French  
expansion. Unfortunately, the experiences of maroons in the island’s west between the 
devastaciones and early French settlement appear nebulous. Nevertheless, as the French 
implemented an increasingly harsh sugar regime, runaways began to flow into Spanish 
territory. The flow of slaves across the border between French Saint-Domingue and Spanish 
Santo Domingo would eventually feature prominently in the conflicts between those colonial 
powers. While the experiences and actions of seventeenth and eighteenth century maroons 
profoundly shaped colonialism on both sides of the island, a discussion of that period is 





African resistance strongly shaped the first century of Spanish Hispaniola. Although that 
resistance is often considered a byproduct of economic and labor arrangements imposed by 
Spanish colonialism, this article emphasizes that maroons, first indigenous and then African, 
occupied broad swaths of the island, establishing self-sufficient subsistence communities. The 
ability of maroons to free themselves from the bonds of slavery, claim suitable locations, 
construct a subsistence base, liberate other slaves from Spanish captivity, and defend their 
communities by force of arms must be understood as a unique form of conquest. 
 
The recasting of maroons as conquerors calls into question the timeline of Spanish conquest 
on Hispaniola. In general, scholars have considered Ovando’s 1503 campaign to be the 
decisive conquest that brought the island fully under Spanish dominion. Yet, this article 
suggests that maroon activity from as early as 1519 belied the completeness of the initial 
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Spanish conquest. From 1519 through the devastaciones and beyond, maroons consistently 
challenged Spanish claims to sovereignty over the island’s people and lands. Moreover, the 
constant conflicts between maroons and Spaniards cannot be divorced from the seventeenth-
century decision to depopulate the north and west of the island. Spanish-maroon conflict may 
not have been the primary impetus for the devastaciones, but it did shape the initial proposal 
of such a policy, just as decades of maroon conquests had laid bare the inability of Spanish 
authorities to control the territorial expanse of the island. 
 
For over a century, maroons proved to be a persistent challenge to Spanish authorities. The 
persistence and proliferation of maroon activities during the sixteenth century contributed to 
the radical decision in 1603 to abandon the western and northern bands of the island. 
Ultimately, this reappraisal of Spanish-maroon conflict reveals the Spanish conquest of 
Hispaniola as an incomplete and prolonged process that lasted well into the seventeenth 
century. Given these realities, the entire sixteenth century can be recast as a period of 
contested conquests, with early Spanish efforts undone by maroons and challenged by foreign 
interlopers. In this light, the devastaciones can be understood as a Spanish attempt at 
retrenchment and consolidation during an ongoing, incomplete conquest. In fact, one might 
argue that the Spanish conquest of Hispaniola remained incomplete until at least the Treaty of 
Ryswick in 1697, recognizing that maroons continued to pose problems to Spanish control 
even after the colony’s territorial bounds were solidified. In recasting maroons as conquerors, 
this article adds to our understanding of the Spanish conquest by recognizing the role played 
by Africans in contesting Spanish claims to land, people, and resources. In Hispaniola, 
African resistance to slavery resulted in more than just a rejection of European colonial 
institutions—it actively challenged Spanish claims of conquest. Recognizing that maroons 
could conquer allows for a greater recognition of the many actors that contributed to the 
complex, drawn-out ebb and flow of European conquests in the Americas. 
 
Finally, recognizing maroon conquests affords us a more nuanced view of colonial 
landscapes. Europeans claimed broad swaths of land by virtue of conquest and occupation. 
Recasting maroons as conquerors challenges Spanish projections of authority over the 
Americas. Maroon communities may have represented fragile enclaves of resistance. Their 
existence could be at times fleeting and their locations transitory, their security dependent on 
careful planning and constant vigilance. They always faced a better armed and equipped foe. 
Nevertheless, their persistent presence on the landscape demonstrates that despite Spanish 
claims to sovereignty, Spaniards did not effectively control all the lands they purported to 
have conquered. To the contrary, runaway African slaves had become conquerors in their own 
right. 
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